Tidbits of appellate CLE here and there

I am not aware of any Arkansas continuing legal education programs dedicated solely to appellate matters appearing in the near future.  However, a couple of upcoming CLE programs do have appellate components.

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern and Western Districts of Arkansas hosts the annual Honorable James G. Mixon Trial Practice Symposium.  This program alternates locations between Little Rock and northwest Arkansas.  This year, the program will be held at the William H. Bowen School of Law in Little Rock on June 5, 2026.

The agenda includes an hour-long session presented by Justice Barbara Webb, entitled "Through the Appellate Lens: A Perspective from the Arkansas Supreme Court."  If you would like to know more about this program, see the information at this link: https://www.areb.uscourts.gov/news/honorable-james-g-mixon-trial-practice-symposium-1

The Arkansas Bar Association's 128th Annual Meeting is scheduled for June 10-12, 2026, in Hot Springs.  On Wednesday, June 10, there are two appeals-related sessions in the "family law" track: two Court of Appeals judges are presenting a session entitled "Life after Nalley," immediately followed by Tory H. Lewis' presentation of "Appellate Update: The Latest and Greatest in Family Law Appeals."  Ms. Lewis, of Taylor & Taylor, is an accomplished advocate in this field.

Then, on Friday, June 12, there is a morning session entitled "Judges' Roundtables."  The participating judges are not named yet, but if memory serves, appellate judges have participated in the recent past.

Here is the home page for the Annual Meeting: https://www.arkbar.com/?pg=annual-meeting

Am I missing anything?  Let me know in the comments, please.

Opinion highlights for the week of April 19, 2026

 

The Arkansas Court of Appeals issued thirteen opinions on April 22, 2026.  The next day, the Arkansas Supreme Court issued five opinions.  We'll note one opinion from each court.

Thornton v. State, 2026 Ark. 71, involved a number of felony convictions resulting in consecutive life sentences.  Thornton's first point on appeal challenged the trial court's denial of his motions to dismiss.  Citing Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1(c), the Supreme Court found that these challenges were not preserved.  A general motion merely asserting the State failed to prove its case does not preserve an issue; the trial court must be advised "of the exact element of the crime that the State failed to prove." Thornton, 2026 Ark. 71, at 8-9

Thornton's motion at trial exceeded a page of text in the report.  But the majority characterized it as "general in nature and lack[ing] the specificity required to preserve his sufficiency challenge for appeal." Id. at 10. The motion included none of the arguments raised on appeal; it merely claimed that the State failed to make a prima facie case and then recited the offenses' elements.  Nor was there any reference to the evidence presented in the case.

The dissent noted the length of Thornton's motion and argued that it addressed each element of the charges. Id. at 15.  The majority responded that "the length of a motion for dismissal is not the relevant inquiry under Rule 33.1...." Thornton, 2026 Ark. 71, at 11 n.5.

There's a Wicks issue thrown into Thornton for good measure.  Thornton argued that his defense counsel was not certified by the Public Defender Commission to serve in Class Y felony cases, and since this affected the structure of his trial, the matter could be raised for the first time on appeal under the third Wicks exception.  The Supreme Court declined the invitation: "[T]he mere possibility that counsel did not obtain a certification from the public defender commission does not constitute a structural error within the third Wicks exception." Thornton, 2026 Ark. 71, at 12.

Conway Lakeside v. Washington County, 2026 Ark. App. 246, is a procedurally complex case to describe.  Your correspondent hesitates to attempt this.  Long story short, the state trial court entered judgment imposing a permanent injunction; the next day, in a parallel federal proceeding, a federal court enjoined some of the parties from taking certain action; then, in response to timely pleadings, the state trial court retroactively stayed the entry of its already-entered judgment in light of the federal action.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal because "there is nothing for us to review." Id. at 6.  The only relief initially ordered by the state trial court was the permanent injunction, but that was now stayed.  The state trial court further "expressed that there was no longer a judgment to speak of" and that a written order would be entered in the future if the situation changed, so "there will be a future written order from which a party could appeal." Id. at 5.

This passage from the opinion may explain the reasoning:

There is a jurisdictionally significant difference between staying entry and staying enforcement of a judgment. A judgment is not effective until it is entered. The judgment the circuit court referred to had already been entered on December 17. 

The Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly contemplate staying entry of an order or judgment; and we particularly discourage doing so retroactively. But we have given effect to a retroactive stay at least once, in a case where staying entry of an order prevented conflict with our jurisdiction during an appeal. ... [The state trial court] could do so in the circumstances.

Id. at 4-5 (citations omitted).  No one appealed from the state trial court's retroactive stay of the entry of the judgment imposing the permanent injunction.  Again, there was nothing to be reviewed.

I told you I was hesitant.  Thanks for reading. 

Opinion highlights for the week of April 12, 2026

 

The Arkansas Court of Appeals handed down ten signed opinions on April 15, 2026.  The next day, the Arkansas Supreme Court handed down five opinions.  There are a couple of items outside of those lists that are worth noting this week, in addition to one of the opinions.

In Hughes v. Bright, the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal because review was improvidently granted.  Three justices dissented in an opinion found at 2026 Ark. 69.  The dissent notes errors in the Court of Appeals' decision previously under review, including error in affirming a trial court conclusion and misapplication of a particular doctrine.  The opinion claims that "[t]he court of appeals has a fundamental misunderstanding of the difference between factual allegations and legal conclusions." Id. at 3.  To the dissenters, "this all ties into a broader problem that has plagued circuit courts and the court of appeals for years: an unwillingness to effectuate the statutory preference for joint custody." Id.

The Court of Appeals' per curiam opinion in Ballegeer v. Ballegeer, 2026 Ark. App. 240, addresses a trial court's authority to enforce its orders while an appeal is pending.  The "mere filing of a notice of appeal" does not deprive a circuit court of that authority, nor does the lodging of the record.  "The purpose of a supersedeas bond is to preserve the status quo during the pendency of an appeal; absent such a bond or a properly granted stay, there is nothing preventing the circuit court from proceeding to enforce its judgment." Id. at 1.  In this case, the appellant did not request a stay or file a supersedeas bond, so "the circuit court retains full authority to enforce its order notwithstanding the pending appeal." Id. at 1-2.

In Mata v. Reyes, 2026 Ark. App. 229, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded a case for specific written findings.  This was a child custody matter; joint custody was not ordered by the trial court.  The statutory presumption favoring joint custody could be rebutted, but the trial court had to enter findings in support of a decision that the presumption was rebutted.  Those findings were not in the trial court's order.

Without the required written findings, we have no way to reliably determine whether the court properly analyzed the facts under the statute.  Due to the statute’s requirement for specific written findings, we cannot presume that the circuit court made such findings as were necessary to support its decision.  Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the circuit court to make the necessary findings concerning whether the joint custody presumption has been rebutted.

Id. at 3 (citations omitted).

Thank you for following along.