The Arkansas Court of Appeals issued thirteen opinions on April 22, 2026. The next day, the Arkansas Supreme Court issued five opinions. We'll note one opinion from each court.
Thornton v. State, 2026 Ark. 71, involved a number of felony convictions resulting in consecutive life sentences. Thornton's first point on appeal challenged the trial court's denial of his motions to dismiss. Citing Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1(c), the Supreme Court found that these challenges were not preserved. A general motion merely asserting the State failed to prove its case does not preserve an issue; the trial court must be advised "of the exact element of the crime that the State failed to prove." Thornton, 2026 Ark. 71, at 8-9
Thornton's motion at trial exceeded a page of text in the report. But the majority characterized it as "general in nature and lack[ing] the specificity required to preserve his sufficiency challenge for appeal." Id. at 10. The motion included none of the arguments raised on appeal; it merely claimed that the State failed to make a prima facie case and then recited the offenses' elements. Nor was there any reference to the evidence presented in the case.
The dissent noted the length of Thornton's motion and argued that it addressed each element of the charges. Id. at 15. The majority responded that "the length of a motion for dismissal is not the relevant inquiry under Rule 33.1...." Thornton, 2026 Ark. 71, at 11 n.5.
There's a Wicks issue thrown into Thornton for good measure. Thornton argued that his defense counsel was not certified by the Public Defender Commission to serve in Class Y felony cases, and since this affected the structure of his trial, the matter could be raised for the first time on appeal under the third Wicks exception. The Supreme Court declined the invitation: "[T]he mere possibility that counsel did not obtain a certification from the public defender commission does not constitute a structural error within the third Wicks exception." Thornton, 2026 Ark. 71, at 12.
Conway Lakeside v. Washington County, 2026 Ark. App. 246, is a procedurally complex case to describe. Your correspondent hesitates to attempt this. Long story short, the state trial court entered judgment imposing a permanent injunction; the next day, in a parallel federal proceeding, a federal court enjoined some of the parties from taking certain action; then, in response to timely pleadings, the state trial court retroactively stayed the entry of its already-entered judgment in light of the federal action.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal because "there is nothing for us to review." Id. at 6. The only relief initially ordered by the state trial court was the permanent injunction, but that was now stayed. The state trial court further "expressed that there was no longer a judgment to speak of" and that a written order would be entered in the future if the situation changed, so "there will be a future written order from which a party could appeal." Id. at 5.
This passage from the opinion may explain the reasoning:
There is a jurisdictionally significant difference between staying entry and staying
enforcement of a judgment. A judgment is not effective until it is entered. The
judgment the circuit court referred to had already been entered on December 17.
The Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly contemplate staying entry
of an order or judgment; and we particularly discourage doing so retroactively. But we
have given effect to a retroactive stay at least once, in a case where staying entry of an order
prevented conflict with our jurisdiction during an appeal. ... [The state trial court] could do so in the circumstances.
Id. at 4-5 (citations omitted). No one appealed from the state trial court's retroactive stay of the entry of the judgment imposing the permanent injunction. Again, there was nothing to be reviewed.
I told you I was hesitant. Thanks for reading.
