Summer break clues - and no invited amicus, yet

 

The Court of Appeals' May 20, 2026, docket offers at least two clues that summer break is near: (1) there are forty-five decisions listed, an unusually high number only seen near the end of a term; and (2) no new cases were submitted for decision.

It will take me a bit to work through these.  If summer break is upon us, please check back here for opinion highlights - surely there's something of interest to this blog in that many decisions.

The Supreme Court did issue a docket yesterday, but no decisions were announced.  Three cases were submitted for decision.  In the past, summer break did not always commence at the same time for our two appellate courts.

Remember my April 7, 2026, post about a request for the Supreme Court to appoint an invited amicus for Sanders v. Arkansas Board of Corrections, CV-25-742?  The argument was that no party wanted to defend the trial court's decision below, so, following United States Supreme Court practice, our Supreme Court should appoint someone to defend that decision.  (See that April 7, 2026, post for more background.)

Yesterday, the Supreme Court remanded the case for the trial court to "consider" a dispositive joint motion.  In that context, the Supreme Court also "dismissed" two motions to appoint an invited amicus.

It is interesting to me that the court did not deny the motions - they were merely dismissed.  What does this mean in terms of the law of the case?  Could an invited amicus be requested at the trial court level upon remand, and again if another appeal ensues?  Stay tuned!

Enjoy your Memorial Day weekend.

Opinion highlights for the week of May 10, 2026

 

The Arkansas Court of Appeals handed down seventeen decisions on May 13, 2026.  The Arkansas Supreme Court did not issue any opinions this week.  We will note a couple of those Court of Appeals decisions in this post.

Hopping v. Scarborough, 2026 Ark. App. 303, involves a child-custody dispute.  One of Hopping's issues on appeal challenged the trial court's award of attorney's fees to Scarborough.  She asked the Court of Appeals to "require a reviewable basis" for the award and to overturn Tiner v. Tiner, 2012 Ark. App. 483, 422 S.W.3d 178.  In making its award, the trial court considered the fee petition and its attachments, Hopping's response, and the factors set forth in Chrisco as modified for domestic relations cases.

The majority agreed with Hopping, remanded the case, and overruled Tiner.  "[E]very decision awarding fees in a domestic-relations case, regardless of the basis on which the court is authorized to award it, should provide this court with findings sufficient to enable it to complete a meaningful review of the fee award." Hopping, 2026 Ark. App. 303, at 10.  In the majority's view, the trial court explained the basis for its award in a "conclusory" fashion.

Simply put, the court’s order does not provide this court with any reasoning on which the court’s fee award can be effectively evaluated. ... There very well may be a rational basis to support the court’s conclusion, but without any explanation from the circuit court as to its reasoning behind the award of fees, we are unable to properly perform our appellate function of evaluating whether the court’s award constituted an abuse of discretion. Consequently, in light of the record before us, we must reverse.

Id. at 13.  The case was reversed and remanded for reconsideration of the fee award, and, to the extent it conflicted with the majority's opinion, the Court of Appeals overruled Tiner.

A dissent contended that the trial court followed precedent in making its fee award.  It also argued that the majority substituted its judgment for that of the trial court.

This issue is an interesting basis for bringing an appeal - did the trial court adequately explain its reasoning, so that the appellate court can perform its function of meaningfully reviewing the trial court's decision?  Both opinions in Hopping - the majority and dissent - are worth your time.

Greenwood v. Greenwood, 2026 Ark. App. 306, involved an appeal from an order of protection.  The Court of Appeals dismissed in part for lack of a final order.  While orders of protection entered under Ark. Code Ann. section 9-15-205 can be appealed as final orders, the order of protection involved here contemplated further action - child support was to be determined in a supplemental order, which was not in the record.

Therefore, because the order of protection contemplates further judicial action and there is no certificate complying with Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), we must dismiss the appeal in part regarding the order of protection... without prejudice for lack of a final order.

Greenwood, 2026 Ark. App. 306, at 18-19.

Thank you for reading. 

Opinion highlights for the week of May 3, 2026

 

On May 6, 2026, the Court of Appeals announced fifteen decisions.  One day later, the Arkansas Supreme Court announced two decisions.  We'll note two of those Court of Appeals decisions.

In Arkansas Department of Human Services v. Rawls, 2026 Ark. App. 284, ADHS appealed a trial court order remanding a case back to an office of ADHS for a hearing and the presentation of evidence.  The Court of Appeals dismissed this appeal for lack of a final, appealable order.

"A circuit court’s order of remand to an administrative agency for further proceedings is not a final, appealable order... if it directs the agency to complete a step that is a predicate to the circuit court’s ultimate decision." Id. at 6 (citations omitted).  A remand order might be final if it involves a ruling on the merits, but that was not the case here.  The trial court's order did not decide the parties' rights - it contemplated further action.

In McChristian v. State, 2026 Ark. App. 288, McChristian argued for reversal based on an evidentiary issue, but he requested a mistrial at trial - so the Court of Appeals applied the demanding standard of review for mistrial arguments.  The court found that the denial of the mistrial motion was not an abuse of discretion.

McChristian also argued that testimony of his bad act was incredulous, because he was incarcerated at the time he was alleged to have acted.  The Court of Appeals decided that this argument was not preserved.

On appeal, McChristian asserts that he was in prison during much of the time [the victim] testified that he sexually abused her. However, during the pretrial argument on the admissibility of [her] testimony, McChristian simply informed the trial court that the assaults could not have occurred because he “was not in Little Rock or North Little Rock at the time of the assaults”; he never informed the trial court that he was incarcerated during the times [she] alleged she was assaulted by him. Parties are bound by the scope and nature of the objections and arguments presented at trial.

Id. at 5.  The Court of Appeals determined that this argument was not preserved for review.

Thank you for reading.