Opinion highlights for the week of April 19, 2026

 

The Arkansas Court of Appeals issued thirteen opinions on April 22, 2026.  The next day, the Arkansas Supreme Court issued five opinions.  We'll note one opinion from each court.

Thornton v. State, 2026 Ark. 71, involved a number of felony convictions resulting in consecutive life sentences.  Thornton's first point on appeal challenged the trial court's denial of his motions to dismiss.  Citing Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1(c), the Supreme Court found that these challenges were not preserved.  A general motion merely asserting the State failed to prove its case does not preserve an issue; the trial court must be advised "of the exact element of the crime that the State failed to prove." Thornton, 2026 Ark. 71, at 8-9

Thornton's motion at trial exceeded a page of text in the report.  But the majority characterized it as "general in nature and lack[ing] the specificity required to preserve his sufficiency challenge for appeal." Id. at 10. The motion included none of the arguments raised on appeal; it merely claimed that the State failed to make a prima facie case and then recited the offenses' elements.  Nor was there any reference to the evidence presented in the case.

The dissent noted the length of Thornton's motion and argued that it addressed each element of the charges. Id. at 15.  The majority responded that "the length of a motion for dismissal is not the relevant inquiry under Rule 33.1...." Thornton, 2026 Ark. 71, at 11 n.5.

There's a Wicks issue thrown into Thornton for good measure.  Thornton argued that his defense counsel was not certified by the Public Defender Commission to serve in Class Y felony cases, and since this affected the structure of his trial, the matter could be raised for the first time on appeal under the third Wicks exception.  The Supreme Court declined the invitation: "[T]he mere possibility that counsel did not obtain a certification from the public defender commission does not constitute a structural error within the third Wicks exception." Thornton, 2026 Ark. 71, at 12.

Conway Lakeside v. Washington County, 2026 Ark. App. 246, is a procedurally complex case to describe.  Your correspondent hesitates to attempt this.  Long story short, the state trial court entered judgment imposing a permanent injunction; the next day, in a parallel federal proceeding, a federal court enjoined some of the parties from taking certain action; then, in response to timely pleadings, the state trial court retroactively stayed the entry of its already-entered judgment in light of the federal action.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal because "there is nothing for us to review." Id. at 6.  The only relief initially ordered by the state trial court was the permanent injunction, but that was now stayed.  The state trial court further "expressed that there was no longer a judgment to speak of" and that a written order would be entered in the future if the situation changed, so "there will be a future written order from which a party could appeal." Id. at 5.

This passage from the opinion may explain the reasoning:

There is a jurisdictionally significant difference between staying entry and staying enforcement of a judgment. A judgment is not effective until it is entered. The judgment the circuit court referred to had already been entered on December 17. 

The Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly contemplate staying entry of an order or judgment; and we particularly discourage doing so retroactively. But we have given effect to a retroactive stay at least once, in a case where staying entry of an order prevented conflict with our jurisdiction during an appeal. ... [The state trial court] could do so in the circumstances.

Id. at 4-5 (citations omitted).  No one appealed from the state trial court's retroactive stay of the entry of the judgment imposing the permanent injunction.  Again, there was nothing to be reviewed.

I told you I was hesitant.  Thanks for reading. 

Opinion highlights for the week of February 22, 2026

 

The Arkansas Supreme Court did not hand down any opinions yesterday - but it was a busy day at the Arkansas Court of Appeals on Wednesday, February 25.  By my count, twenty-six signed opinions and one per curiam opinion were issued by the Court of Appeals.  That per curiam opinion may be the most interesting of the lot from an appellate practitioner's standpoint, but we'll consider a couple of the other opinions, too.

In Tate v. Phillips County, 2026 Ark. App. 141, Tate moved to remand her appeal for lack of a final order.  Apparently, in an attempt to comply with Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b), the required Rule 54(b) certificate was signed and entered as a "stand-alone" document; it did not follow immediately after the circuit judge's signature on the judgment.  Tate conceded that this certificate did not suffice to confer jurisdiction on appeal, and asked for a remand for entry of a compliant judgment and certificate.

Instead of granting Tate's motion, the Court of Appeals dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, due to improper placement of the certificate.

Rule 54(b)(1) requires that a proper certificate “shall appear immediately after the court’s signature on the judgment.” (Emphasis added.) Our supreme court has construed the word “shall” when used in our rules of civil procedure to mean that compliance is mandatory. The plain language of the rule therefore requires that the certificate be located on the judgment immediately after the court’s signature. ...

...

Because the circuit court’s purported certificate in this case was not located on the judgment, it is insufficient to permit an appeal under Rule 54(b). Because the order before us is not final, we lack jurisdiction over the matter and have no recourse other than to dismiss the appeal.

Tate, 2026 Ark. App. 141, at 2-3 (citations omitted).

The concurrence and dissent in Tate are both worth reading.  The concurrence notes the benefit of having a settled, bright-line rule, even if we don't like it.  It also offers a form certificate in compliance with Rule 54(b).  The dissent makes the point that everything required for jurisdiction was in the record, just not in the proper order.  It questions why the court didn't grant Tate's motion and remand, instead of dismissing the appeal - that would have been a less costly and time-consuming approach.

Settles v. State, 2026 Ark. App. 119, addresses the specificity required for a proper motion for directed verdict.  Settles' motion argued that "he didn't do anything that the statute required him to do," and noted particular acts he did not take. Id. at 2.  One reason the Court of Appeals did not reach this argument is lack of specificity.  "To preserve for appeal a court’s decision on a directed-verdict motion, the issue must be stated clearly and specifically to the circuit court." Id. at 4. Settles' contention that he did not do "anything" was not specific enough: "Because he did not identify the elements of the crime set forth in the statute, Settles’ motion did not meet the specificity requirements of Rule 33.1." Id. at 5.

Finally, Humes v. State, 2026 Ark. App. 122, notes a recent exchange on the Arkansas Supreme Court.  Humes challenged the sufficiency of the State's evidence.  The Court of Appeals "reviewed the entire record" but noted in a footnote:

 

Following our supreme court’s lead, we have restricted our consideration in this criminal sufficiency-of-evidence appeal to evidence that tended to support the conviction. Our supreme court’s most recent decisions in this area have omitted that express restriction. Compare Matthews v. State, 2025 Ark. 213, at 4–5, 725 S.W.3d 16, 19 (citing Jones v. State, 269 Ark. 119, 598 S.W.2d 748 (1980)..., with Matthews, 2025 Ark. 213, at 8, 725 S.W.3d at 21 (Baker, C.J., concurring) (objecting that the majority omitted the restriction from the standard of review); see also Reaves v. State, 2025 Ark. 202, 725 S.W.3d 22 (omitting the same restriction the same day); Tait v. State, 2026 Ark. 28 (omitting it since). Because the outcome in this appeal is the same whether we look at all the evidence or some of it, here we merely note the issue.

Humes, 2026 Ark. App. 122, at 4 n.1 (some citations omitted). 

Thank you for reading.

Opinion highlights for the week of January 25, 2026

 

Despite the weather, our appellate courts handed down decisions this week.  Ten opinions appear on the Court of Appeals' January 28, 2026, docket; two opinions were issued by the Supreme Court the next day.

Two opinions involve what seems to be a rarity: successful "sufficiency of the evidence" arguments.  These are fact-intensive, so I'm not going to spend a lot of time on them here; you should read these opinions if you are interested in winning "sufficiency" arguments.  In Parris v. State, 2026 Ark. 5, the Supreme Court reversed a theft by receiving conviction for lack of substantial evidence: the conviction was based upon inadmissible hearsay about the gun having been stolen.

And in Keeton v. State, 2026 Ark. App. 53, the Court of Appeals reversed and dismissed an obstructing governmental operations conviction, where the basis for the State's case was correct advice the defendant gave her daughter.  The defendant had no interaction with officers attempting to serve a warrant upon her daughter; she merely told her daughter on the phone that she did not have to answer the door.  The evidence was thus insufficient to sustain the conviction.

The Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction in Caldwell v. Arkansas Racing Commission, 2026 Ark. App. 50.  Caldwell appealed an unfavorable Commission decision, but he submitted an untimely petition for review.  The circuit court noted that untimeliness but also addressed the merits in a decision favoring the Commission.  Caldwell then appealed that circuit court decision.  The Court of Appeals found that the circuit court did not err when it found the petition for review to be untimely.

[T]he petition for judicial review was untimely filed in circuit court. This means that court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the additional arguments Caldwell raised. So, too, we lack jurisdiction beyond the task of deciding the threshold question of whether the circuit court had jurisdiction to review the Commission’s decision; as we have explained, it did not, so the Commission’s decision is affirmed.

Id. at 8.

Finally, in Taylor v. Independence County, 2026 Ark. App. 54, the Arkansas Court of Appeals acknowledged that Taylor could raise the Independence County Court's jurisdiction for the first time on appeal.  Apparently the county court issued an order despite the absence of any judicial proceeding invoking the county court's jurisdiction.

The Arkansas Supreme Court also issued a number of per curiam orders, including one noting proposed changes to rules of appellate procedure.  If those proposals are worth reporting here, I will do so by a separate post.

Thank you for reading.