Although about a year away, if you handle federal appeals - or just want an excuse to visit Davenport, Iowa - this might need to be on your calendar.
A blog about appellate practice and procedure in Arkansas - and anything else about appeals that might interest you.
Thus, the issue is not ripe for our review. Moreover, at this juncture and without knowing the specifics surrounding the ultimate sale of the property, any determination as to the authority of AFF to sell the property at issue would constitute an advisory opinion. This court will not render an advisory opinion.
While the order purports to cure the defective Rule 54(b) certificate—it being a separate document from the judgment—it is insufficient. The after-the-fact order consolidating the pleadings does not trump the statutory requirement that the Rule 54(b) certificate be placed on the judgment itself immediately following the court’s signature. Here, it is a complete standalone document with its own case caption. Further, the record demonstrates that although the two pleadings were refiled together as instructed by the court, there were no changes to the documents themselves.
As the Department explains, Kristen does not support any of the above arguments with citations to any legal authority. “We do not consider arguments without convincing argument or citation to authority where it is not apparent without further research that the arguments are well-taken.”
Were it not for the State’s thorough supplemental statement of the case and facts, we would not reach the merits of this appeal without first requiring that the case be rebriefed. Appellant’s statement of the case and facts is woefully deficient, providing only an overview of the case’s procedural path to trial, a brief description of the portion of the trial testimony and the instruction to which McDaniel objected, and references to his motions for directed verdict. The statement of the case does not provide any substantive testimony or evidence, which is especially troubling when considering that the transcript is over one thousand pages long and McDaniel challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction.
Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 4-2 directs counsel on the required contents of appellate briefs: the statement of the case and facts shall include all information in the appellate record that is essential to understand the case and decide the issues on appeal. Ark. R. Sup. Ct. R. 4-2(6). The requirements of Rule 4-2 are mandatory. McDaniel’s counsel is not alone in failing to provide an adequate statement of the case. This is a frequent occurrence and merits all appellate counsel’s review of Rule 4-2 and adherence thereto.
Simply put, the court’s order does not provide this court with any reasoning on which the court’s fee award can be effectively evaluated. ... There very well may be a rational basis to support the court’s conclusion, but without any explanation from the circuit court as to its reasoning behind the award of fees, we are unable to properly perform our appellate function of evaluating whether the court’s award constituted an abuse of discretion. Consequently, in light of the record before us, we must reverse.
Therefore, because the order of protection contemplates further judicial action and there is no certificate complying with Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), we must dismiss the appeal in part regarding the order of protection... without prejudice for lack of a final order.
On appeal, McChristian asserts that he was in prison during much of the time [the victim] testified that he sexually abused her. However, during the pretrial argument on the admissibility of [her] testimony, McChristian simply informed the trial court that the assaults could not have occurred because he “was not in Little Rock or North Little Rock at the time of the assaults”; he never informed the trial court that he was incarcerated during the times [she] alleged she was assaulted by him. Parties are bound by the scope and nature of the objections and arguments presented at trial.
Consequently, we conclude that this appeal has widespread ramifications, that our review is necessary to maintain uniformity, and that this is precisely the kind of appeal that Rule 3 gives us the flexibility to hear. We grant the State’s appeal.
Thus far in fiscal year 2026, the court of appeals has awarded attorney's fees 132 times totaling $289,109.75. By comparison, the court had awarded fees 96 times totaling $225,054.71 on April 1, 2025.
There is a jurisdictionally significant difference between staying entry and staying enforcement of a judgment. A judgment is not effective until it is entered. The judgment the circuit court referred to had already been entered on December 17.
The Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly contemplate staying entry of an order or judgment; and we particularly discourage doing so retroactively. But we have given effect to a retroactive stay at least once, in a case where staying entry of an order prevented conflict with our jurisdiction during an appeal. ... [The state trial court] could do so in the circumstances.
Without the required written findings, we have no way to reliably determine whether the court properly analyzed the facts under the statute. Due to the statute’s requirement for specific written findings, we cannot presume that the circuit court made such findings as were necessary to support its decision. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the circuit court to make the necessary findings concerning whether the joint custody presumption has been rebutted.
Here, the statement of the case consists of eight short sentences basically stating that appellant was charged, tried, and convicted. Clearly, this is woefully deficient and ordinarily merits rebriefing. However, Rule 4-2(b) allows an appellee’s brief to supplement the statement of the case if the appellee believes it to be insufficient, which the State did in this case.
The State argues that appellant’s argument is not preserved because appellant mistakenly references only the motion for continuance filed by [a private attorney attempting to appear] and not the motion filed and argued by appellant’s counsel. Because appellant’s counsel essentially adopted the motion for continuance filed by [the private attorney] and because both motions argued that a continuance was needed to allow appellant to proceed with private counsel, we address appellant’s arguments on appeal.
While it is not necessary to specifically state the lesser-included offense by name, the elements of that lesser-included offense must be addressed in the directed-verdict motion. Neither of the elements addressed by Toney are elements of the crimes of which she was convicted. Furthermore, none of the arguments below preserved the arguments raised on appeal regarding lack of evidence to prove that Toney was an accomplice. Accordingly, Toney has failed to preserve her challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence of either offense.